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PEAR Archive_Tar version 1.4.3 and earlier contains a CWE-502, CWE-915 vulnerability in the Archive_Tar class. There are several file operations with `$v_header['filename']` as parameter (such as file_exists, is_file, is_dir, etc). When extract is called without a specific prefix path, we can trigger unserialization by crafting a tar file with `phar://[path_to_malicious_phar_file]` as path. Object injection can be used to trigger destruct in the loaded PHP classes, e.g. the Archive_Tar class itself. With Archive_Tar object injection, arbitrary file deletion can occur because `@unlink($this->_temp_tarname)` is called. If another class with useful gadget is loaded, it may possible to cause remote code execution that can result in files being deleted or possibly modified. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in 1.4.4.
PEAR Archive_Tar version 1.4.3 and earlier contains a CWE-502, CWE-915 vulnerability in the Archive_Tar class. There are several file operations with `$v_header['filename']` as parameter (such as file_exists, is_file, is_dir, etc). When extract is called without a specific prefix path, we can trigger unserialization by crafting a tar file with `phar://[path_to_malicious_phar_file]` as path. Object injection can be used to trigger destruct in the loaded PHP classes, e.g. the Archive_Tar class itself. With Archive_Tar object injection, arbitrary file deletion can occur because `@unlink($this->_temp_tarname)` is called. If another class with useful gadget is loaded, it may possible to cause remote code execution that can result in files being deleted or possibly modified. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in 1.4.4.
CVSS 3.0 Base Score 8.8. CVSS Attack Vector: network. CVSS Attack Complexity: low. CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).
CVSS 2.0 Base Score 6.8. CVSS Attack Vector: network. CVSS Attack Complexity: medium. CVSS Vector: (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P).
This code snippet deserializes an object from a file and uses it as a UI button:
}in.close();This code does not attempt to verify the source or contents of the file before deserializing it. An attacker may be able to replace the intended file with a file that contains arbitrary malicious code which will be executed when the button is pressed.
To mitigate this, explicitly define final readObject() to prevent deserialization. An example of this is:
throw new java.io.IOException("Cannot be deserialized"); }In Python, the Pickle library handles the serialization and deserialization processes. In this example derived from [R.502.7], the code receives and parses data, and afterwards tries to authenticate a user based on validating a token.
}
raise AuthFailUnfortunately, the code does not verify that the incoming data is legitimate. An attacker can construct a illegitimate, serialized object "AuthToken" that instantiates one of Python's subprocesses to execute arbitrary commands. For instance,the attacker could construct a pickle that leverages Python's subprocess module, which spawns new processes and includes a number of arguments for various uses. Since Pickle allows objects to define the process for how they should be unpickled, the attacker can direct the unpickle process to call Popen in the subprocess module and execute /bin/sh.
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