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SeaCMS v6.61 allows Remote Code execution by placing PHP code in an allowed IP address (aka ip) to /admin/admin_ip.php (aka /adm1n/admin_ip.php). The code is executed by visiting adm1n/admin_ip.php or data/admin/ip.php. This can also be exploited through CSRF.
SeaCMS v6.61 allows Remote Code execution by placing PHP code in an allowed IP address (aka ip) to /admin/admin_ip.php (aka /adm1n/admin_ip.php). The code is executed by visiting adm1n/admin_ip.php or data/admin/ip.php. This can also be exploited through CSRF.
CVSS 3.0 Base Score 8.8. CVSS Attack Vector: network. CVSS Attack Complexity: low. CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).
CVSS 2.0 Base Score 6.8. CVSS Attack Vector: network. CVSS Attack Complexity: medium. CVSS Vector: (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P).
This example attempts to write user messages to a message file and allow users to view them.
}echo "Message Saved!<p>\n";include($MessageFile);While the programmer intends for the MessageFile to only include data, an attacker can provide a message such as:
message=%3C?php%20system(%22/bin/ls%20-l%22);?%3Ewhich will decode to the following:
<?php system("/bin/ls -l");?>The programmer thought they were just including the contents of a regular data file, but PHP parsed it and executed the code. Now, this code is executed any time people view messages.
Notice that XSS (CWE-79) is also possible in this situation.
edit-config.pl: This CGI script is used to modify settings in a configuration file.
}
# code to add a field/key to a file goes here
# code to set key to a particular file goes here
# code to delete key from a particular file goes here
eval($code);# this is super-efficient code, especially if you have to invoke# any one of dozens of different functions!handleConfigAction($configfile, param('action'));print "No action specified!\n";The script intends to take the 'action' parameter and invoke one of a variety of functions based on the value of that parameter - config_file_add_key(), config_file_set_key(), or config_file_delete_key(). It could set up a conditional to invoke each function separately, but eval() is a powerful way of doing the same thing in fewer lines of code, especially when a large number of functions or variables are involved. Unfortunately, in this case, the attacker can provide other values in the action parameter, such as: add_key(",","); system("/bin/ls"); This would produce the following string in handleConfigAction(): config_file_add_key(",","); system("/bin/ls"); Any arbitrary Perl code could be added after the attacker has "closed off" the construction of the original function call, in order to prevent parsing errors from causing the malicious eval() to fail before the attacker's payload is activated. This particular manipulation would fail after the system() call, because the "_key(\$fname, \$key, \$val)" portion of the string would cause an error, but this is irrelevant to the attack because the payload has already been activated.
This example PHP code attempts to secure the form submission process by validating that the user submitting the form has a valid session. A CSRF attack would not be prevented by this countermeasure because the attacker forges a request through the user's web browser in which a valid session already exists.
The following HTML is intended to allow a user to update a profile.
</form>profile.php contains the following code.
}//if the session is registered to a valid user then allow update
exit;// Redirect user to login page// The user session is valid, so process the request// and update the information
echo "Your profile has been successfully updated.";// read in the data from $POST and send an update// to the databaseThis code may look protected since it checks for a valid session. However, CSRF attacks can be staged from virtually any tag or HTML construct, including image tags, links, embed or object tags, or other attributes that load background images.
The attacker can then host code that will silently change the username and email address of any user that visits the page while remaining logged in to the target web application. The code might be an innocent-looking web page such as:
</form>form.submit();// send to profile.phpNotice how the form contains hidden fields, so when it is loaded into the browser, the user will not notice it. Because SendAttack() is defined in the body's onload attribute, it will be automatically called when the victim loads the web page.
Assuming that the user is already logged in to victim.example.com, profile.php will see that a valid user session has been established, then update the email address to the attacker's own address. At this stage, the user's identity has been compromised, and messages sent through this profile could be sent to the attacker's address.
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