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An unauthenticated attacker over the network can attach to an open interface exposed through JNDI by the User Defined Search (UDS) of SAP NetWeaver Process Integration (PI) - version 7.50 and make use of an open naming and directory API to access services which can be used to perform unauthorized operations affecting users and data across the entire system. This allows the attacker to have full read access to user data, make limited modifications to user data, and degrade the performance of the system, leading to a high impact on confidentiality and a limited impact on the availability and integrity of the application.
CVSS 3.1 Base Score 8.6. CVSS Attack Vector: network. CVSS Attack Complexity: low. CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L).
In 2008, a large number of web servers were compromised using the same SQL injection attack string. This single string worked against many different programs. The SQL injection was then used to modify the web sites to serve malicious code.
The following code dynamically constructs and executes a SQL query that searches for items matching a specified name. The query restricts the items displayed to those where owner matches the user name of the currently-authenticated user.
...The query that this code intends to execute follows:
SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = <userName> AND itemname = <itemName>;However, because the query is constructed dynamically by concatenating a constant base query string and a user input string, the query only behaves correctly if itemName does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string:
name' OR 'a'='afor itemName, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = 'wiley' AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';The addition of the:
OR 'a'='acondition causes the WHERE clause to always evaluate to true, so the query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM items;This simplification of the query allows the attacker to bypass the requirement that the query only return items owned by the authenticated user; the query now returns all entries stored in the items table, regardless of their specified owner.
This code intends to print a message summary given the message ID.
mysql_query("SELECT MessageID, Subject FROM messages WHERE MessageID = '$id'");The programmer may have skipped any input validation on $id under the assumption that attackers cannot modify the cookie. However, this is easy to do with custom client code or even in the web browser.
While $id is wrapped in single quotes in the call to mysql_query(), an attacker could simply change the incoming mid cookie to:
1432' or '1' = '1This would produce the resulting query:
SELECT MessageID, Subject FROM messages WHERE MessageID = '1432' or '1' = '1'Not only will this retrieve message number 1432, it will retrieve all other messages.
In this case, the programmer could apply a simple modification to the code to eliminate the SQL injection:
mysql_query("SELECT MessageID, Subject FROM messages WHERE MessageID = '$id'");However, if this code is intended to support multiple users with different message boxes, the code might also need an access control check (CWE-285) to ensure that the application user has the permission to see that message.
This example attempts to take a last name provided by a user and enter it into a database.
$query = "INSERT INTO last_names VALUES('$userKey', '$name')";# ensure only letters, hyphens and apostrophe are allowedWhile the programmer applies a whitelist to the user input, it has shortcomings. First of all, the user is still allowed to provide hyphens which are used as comment structures in SQL. If a user specifies -- then the remainder of the statement will be treated as a comment, which may bypass security logic. Furthermore, the whitelist permits the apostrophe which is also a data / command separator in SQL. If a user supplies a name with an apostrophe, they may be able to alter the structure of the whole statement and even change control flow of the program, possibly accessing or modifying confidential information. In this situation, both the hyphen and apostrophe are legitimate characters for a last name and permitting them is required. Instead, a programmer may want to use a prepared statement or apply an encoding routine to the input to prevent any data / directive misinterpretations.
In the following Java example the method createBankAccount is used to create a BankAccount object for a bank management application.
}
return account;However, there is no authentication mechanism to ensure that the user creating this bank account object has the authority to create new bank accounts. Some authentication mechanisms should be used to verify that the user has the authority to create bank account objects.
The following Java code includes a boolean variable and method for authenticating a user. If the user has not been authenticated then the createBankAccount will not create the bank account object.
}// authenticate user,// if user is authenticated then set variable to true// otherwise set variable to false...
return account;account.setBalance(balance);This function runs an arbitrary SQL query on a given database, returning the result of the query.
$employeeRecord = runEmployeeQuery('EmployeeDB',$_GET['EmployeeName']);return $preparedStatement->fetchAll();//Use a prepared statement to avoid CWE-89/.../While this code is careful to avoid SQL Injection, the function does not confirm the user sending the query is authorized to do so. An attacker may be able to obtain sensitive employee information from the database.
The following program could be part of a bulletin board system that allows users to send private messages to each other. This program intends to authenticate the user before deciding whether a private message should be displayed. Assume that LookupMessageObject() ensures that the $id argument is numeric, constructs a filename based on that id, and reads the message details from that file. Also assume that the program stores all private messages for all users in the same directory.
DisplayPrivateMessage($id);print "Body: " . encodeHTML($Message->{body}) . "\n";# For purposes of this example, assume that CWE-309 and# CWE-523 do not apply.ExitError("invalid username or password");While the program properly exits if authentication fails, it does not ensure that the message is addressed to the user. As a result, an authenticated attacker could provide any arbitrary identifier and read private messages that were intended for other users.
One way to avoid this problem would be to ensure that the "to" field in the message object matches the username of the authenticated user.
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